

LETTERS

Hayes and Charlton Commended

Dear *ARMOR*,

In the November-December 2003 *ARMOR*, Captain Brian Hayes, "Simplifying the Heavy Brigade/Task Force Operations Order," identifies a true problem in the era of rapid movement of forces on the digital battlefield. He correctly identifies the growth of the long complex order being the requirements at the National Training Center. Unfortunately, he does not clearly suggest a solution!

Let me suggest that subsequent to an initial situation briefing and terrain appreciation almost all subsequent operations will be done by a fragmentary order (FRAGO). The requirement then produces both FRAGOs and situation reports that can be displayed in the turret of the subordinate leader's armored vehicle. LTC Charlton suggests one solution in his article, "Digital Battle Command: Baptism by Fire." He suggests a revamping of the mission data loader (MDL). The MDL's modernization could go beyond Charlton's suggestion. It could include dynamic sequenced overlays that reflect the commander's intent and scheme of maneuver. There should also be the ability to continually update a synchronization matrix based on the flow of the battle. This would provide the situational awareness on current status of enemy and friendly units, in addition to anticipated branches and sequels to the basic plan. These branches and sequels then could become the basis of the FRAGOs mentioned before.

Both Hayes and Charlton are to be commended for their efforts and if they were to collaborate on a solution, the Army could have a much more user friendly command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) system.

COL BRUCE B.G. CLARKE
U.S. Army, Retired

1-35 Armor First to Air Land M1A1s

Dear *ARMOR*,

I read with interest Major Maddox's article, "Checkmate on the Northern Front," in the September-October 2003 issue of *ARMOR*. Although it was an interesting and informative piece on the deployment of Task Force 1st Battalion, 63d Armor, I would like to suggest one correction. Major Maddox states that this was the first time an M1A1 had air landed in support of combat operations. I would suggest that 1st Battalion, 35th Armor, stationed in Baumholder, Germany, has that distinction. Charlie Company, 1-35 Armor, as part Task Force Hawk, air landed a company of M1A1 tanks twice in support of combat operations in the Balkans. Charlie Company left Ramstein Air Force Base and landed in Tirana, Albania. Charlie Company then landed in Skopje, Macedonia, and led ground forces into Kosovo as part of Task Force 1-6 Infantry.

EDWARD L. COX
CPT, U.S. Army

Altieri Takes Hostile Fire

Dear *ARMOR*,

Major Altieri invited us to fire when ready and I'm sure many have. He points out that infantry and medics don't have the protection of several inches of armor — the bad guys don't fire 125mm APDS rounds at grunts, either — that argument is pretty specious. I don't see where improving the morale of tankers and scouts will hurt the morale of infantry — I earned an expert infantry badge during my 5 years in the infantry and wear it with pride — I earned something during my 15 years in armor and would like to wear *that* with pride as well. (I managed to be in the right place at the right time, and in 3 years of Regular Army service and 31 years of National Guard, I never heard a shot fired in anger. But if I had heard one, it probably would be just one, because I was well within the circular area of probability and radius damage of anything the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, cared to shoot at the 530th and 559th Field Artillery Missile Battalions, and if Ivan came over the line, he would have shot something *big* at them, since their job was to shoot something *big* at him.)

We don't have colored piping on our overseas caps any more, as a matter of fact, I guess we don't have "overseas" (I won't use the more common name) caps any more, so I feel every armed service should have an expert whatever badge similar to the EIB, in the branch color, with a representation of the symbol of the branch — good motivation to learn and *do* your job, whatever it may be, to the best of your ability. And if you come under hostile fire, a silver wreath should surround the badge — you don't have to be Brand X to get shot at, ask Jessica Lynch.

With all due respect, I'd also like to remind Major General Tait that the colors red and white are the colors of a cavalry guidon, just as dark blue and white are the colors of an infantry guidon. Dark blue is not infantry's color — I believe it's officially "robins' egg blue" — like on an infantry shoulder cord or a CIB or EIB; and red and white are not cavalry's colors — "around her neck, she wore a red-and-white ribbon," might be hard to write music to. And a yellow guidon would be just as hard to see against the setting sun during a retreat parade as light blue against a beautiful clear sky.

The next order may move to the firing line.

MSG CARL A. PAVEL
U.S. Army, Retired

Dear *ARMOR*,

I read Major Jayson Altieri's letter with interest regarding the combat tanker badge in the November-December issue.

I must admit he made some valid points. Among them that Sergeant Graves could have chosen to enlist in the infantry branch. I will note that the biggest reasons given by my infantry friends as to why they want nothing to do with tanks usually involves comments about "iron coffins" or the "biggest targets on the bat-

tlefield" (many haven't checked the height of the Bradley, apparently). Following his logic, however, the majority of infantrymen in recent actions no more qualify for the CIB than do tankers. Time away from their vehicles is primarily devoted to maintenance, observation posts, chow, and local security. This is not to disparage or belittle their heroism, but I ask does it really involve more courage to charge (run) across a field to assault a position, than it does to deliberately move out and draw tank/antitank fire so your buddies can pick off the shooter? Is it necessary to put a measure on either?

Strictly speaking, following Major Altieri's logic, the only infantrymen that qualify for a CIB would be those assigned as dismounts, in a mechanized unit, or to the 10th, 25th, 82d, or 101st divisions. More to the point by the original standards, only those soldiers in those units who spent 30 days or more in actual combat (define that please) would qualify. On the other hand, how about the cavalry, armor, artillery, or (yes) even quartermaster soldiers who are patrolling the streets and fields of Iraq? I think I understand General Shinseki's logic with the beret; it involves inclusion and appreciation of the total Army. I do not claim to know what General Marshal's intent was when the award was established (reference: Major General Tait's letter). Perhaps Lieutenant General Reno can enlighten us. But it seems to me that in line with General Schoomaker's "every soldier is an infantryman" effort, that, at minimum, soldiers who meet all the criteria of the award, except for MOS, be awarded 11B as a secondary MOS, with service in that MOS for the period of the award and the CIB be granted for that service. Would this "reduce the value of the award"? I would say that the standards for granting it are clearly different today than they were in 1944 or 1968, but that does not mean today's infantryman is less deserving. I do not think so. So perhaps there is room (and reason) to be more inclusive with the original award, rather than create a separate award for each branch.

A retired command sergeant major told me that if you were not Airborne, you were not really in the Army. I understand the pride from which that comes, but can we afford, in this modern smaller Army, to continue to foster these attitudes, which serve to tear down comrades rather than build each other up. This may be the more important question.

1SG TERRY FOLSOM
U.S. Army, Retired

Dear *ARMOR*,

I have written on the subject of a combat tanker badge numerous times over the past 12 years, with my letters appearing in *Army Times*, *Stars and Stripes*, and *ARMOR*. Given my interest in the topic, I was gratified to see the historical background of the issue covered so impeccably by CPT Shawn Monien in his article, "Reinstating the Combat Tanker Badge" (*ARMOR*, September-October 2003). Having said my peace so many times in various fo-

rums, I was not inclined to offer further comment. I quickly changed my mind however, after reading through the "Letters" section of the November-December edition of *ARMOR*. Three letters concerning the combat tanker badge appeared in this section and I'd like the opportunity to address the authors of each one.

First, as a tanker who fought during Desert Shield/Storm, I'd like to express my personal gratitude to retired Major General Thomas H. Tait. Sir, your efforts to secure that which members of our branch have rightfully earned and long deserved are much appreciated. As a lieutenant writing to *ARMOR* 12 years ago, I was unaware of the campaign you were waging on behalf of the badge. A much belated thank you, sir, for the good fight you fought then and for keeping up the fire now.

Retired SGM Healy, with respect, I hope that your prediction concerning awarding the badge proves incorrect. I have always contended that awarding the badge should be retroactive. The badge is an outward symbol of the direct-fire contribution that our branch makes to every hostile engagement the Army fights as a combined arms team. That contribution began 85 years ago on 12 September 1918, when the first American tanks took to the field of battle at St. Mihiel, France, and has been maintained by tankers and cavalrymen since.

In the paragraph above, I used the words "rightfully earned and long deserved" with a particular intent. The recognition due to the soldiers of the Armored Force has no "shelf life," nor should an artificial one be contrived and instituted. Consider for a moment the American tanker who faced Tigers in his hopelessly outgunned M4 during the Normandy breakout. How about the Korean War tanker who pushed his M26 to the banks of the Yalu with scores of Red Chinese in front of it? What about the M48 tanker or the ACAV crewman who escorted convoys along Highway 1 in Vietnam while nursing a transmission weak from "jungle busting" in pursuit of an elusive foe? Can anyone honestly say that their contributions are less worthy of recognition because time has elapsed? These individuals built the reputation the Armored Force enjoys today and are as equally entitled to the badge as the contemporary tanker and scout, if not more so. On reinstating the combat tanker badge, every effort should be made to ensure our comrades from previous conflicts receive what they have earned.

MAJ Altieri, your comments indicate that you do not truly understand the issue at hand. In regards to CPT Monien's article, your comments strike me as non-sequitur and I'd encourage you to reread his article. This is not a question of who faces the greatest danger with the least amount of protection. Were this the case, we'd be well advised to supplement the CIB with an award for those who opt to go into battle wearing nothing more than a pair of boxer shorts and carrying a slingshot. If "protection" or, more precisely, the lack thereof, was the all-important criterion, then by your own logic, the mechanized infantryman who fought from a Bradley should be stripped of his CIB. After all, he had the "benefit of several inches

of steel," as well as the "benefit of some type of mechanization." Of course, no one wants to see that happen. However, if mere vulnerability were the issue, I'd submit that a tank has more weapons systems pointed at it in a fight than nearly anything else on the battlefield.

The issue is recognizing participation in direct-fire, ground combat through a specific uniform device. The badge indicates the wearer's personal contribution to that unique form of armed conflict. A combat patch indicating, "I was there," is simply not enough for those at the tip of the spear. As you so accurately pointed out, each of us had a choice as to what we signed on to do in the Army. Many of us opted for combat arms — those that close with and destroy the enemy. While not detracting from the considerable contributions of other branches toward this end, their efforts are conducted in support of combat operations; the essence of what we do in this profession is defined by combat arms. If we see fit to recognize one branch that engages the enemy on the ground with direct fire, we need to recognize all branches that have this as their primary battlefield role.

As a final note MAJ Altieri, I question the motivation of anyone who would deny recognition of achievement to those who have rightfully earned it. This is particularly curious when it comes from an individual who is not a member of either of the branches immediately affected by this issue. Allow me to be a bit more magnanimous than others have been: I gladly support branch-specific combat badges for each of the combat arms — armor, infantry, field artillery, air defense artillery, aviation, engineers, and Special Forces. The contributions rendered on the battlefield by the soldiers of these branches deserve special recognition.

RONALD J. BASHISTA
MAJ, U.S. Army

More Badge Comments

Dear *ARMOR*,

Perhaps I can shed a bit of light on the disparate nature of expert and combat badges. One of the key reasons why there are so many infantry-type badges, and virtually none for anyone else, has its roots in World War II. Late in the war, General George C. Marshall bemoaned the fact that few men wished to join the ranks of his beloved infantry. Quite frankly, I find this humorous to a degree, since as the Army Chief of Staff, one would think he could have ensured that sufficient manpower was steered to the infantry. Instead, the way to bring incentive to the PBI (poor, bloody infantry) was to give them a series of distinctive badges to enhance their status. Only over the years have other branches been grudgingly granted a few badges of their own. As serious competitors to the PBI, armor and armored cavalry soldiers have been neglected. Until the U.S. Army has a Chief of Staff with an extensive armor background, this will not change.

ANONYMOUS

Army Transformation Done Right

Dear *ARMOR*,

As the Army continues to pursue rapid transformation, the solution is at hand here and now. The foundation has long since been laid and the project can be completed almost immediately. The solution lies in exploiting our successes in command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and begins with converting heavy divisions and heavy separate brigades into Armored Cavalry Regiments.

Regarding a lighter, more deployable and sustainable force — we're there! The transformed current force was demonstrated during Operation Iraqi Freedom. We just haven't noticed it as we confuse light forces with light vehicles.

Since the early 1980s, armored family of vehicles (AFV), heavy force modernization (HFM), and armored systems modernization (ASM) were all simplistic modernization approaches of one-for-one swaps with lighter equivalent systems. Their focus on commonality, while trading off capabilities (limited by technologies), guaranteed unaffordable failures.

Those dead-end efforts and even the still-on-going Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) have been overcome by events. War came and, like a decade ago, we deployed the heavy divisions. Only this time, the Current Force exploited its advanced C4ISR to confidently deploy a dramatically smaller force. Instead of deploying corps, our heavy divisions sufficed. Situational understanding and precision maneuver achieved efficiency. The Army needs to quit lamenting the logistics cost of sustaining the most lethal, survivable, and maneuverable force on the planet just because the vehicles are heavy — they are "war winners."

Regarding organizational changes — let's do it! The Army has spent decades evolving into Division '86, Army of Excellence (AOE), Force XXI, Mobile Strike Force, Conservative Heavy Division, Army After Next (AAN), and so on. Although combat capability obviously improved through new equipment, the organizational changes were little more than shuffling around subunits. Aside from new equipment (especially aviation), today's heavy division looks much like its WWII ancestor. Even the yet-evolving future combat system (FCS) units of action/units of employment (UA/UE) are simply conventional brigades, divisions and corps, only under new names. What is constantly being sought but never resolved is creating a smaller (brigade-sized) unit with robust combat power and extreme flexibility.

For once, let's try something that we know can work; something that we already have. The Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) is the most flexible and potent combat organization we have. It is structured for independent operations over a large area, yet can concentrate tremendous combat power. It is far leaner and yet more lethal than any comparably sized brigade.

The ACR has three cavalry squadrons, an aviation squadron, and a support squadron,

along with regimental chemical, engineer, air defense artillery, and military intelligence companies.

Each cavalry squadron has 3 cavalry troops (9 tanks and 13 cavalry fighting vehicles), a tank company (14 tanks), and a field artillery battery (6 155mm SP). This is the equivalent of a full tank battalion, a full infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) battalion, and a field artillery battery.

Accordingly, even though it has less than 5,000 soldiers, the ACR has the equivalent of three tank battalions, three IFV battalions, a field artillery battalion, and an aviation battalion. Except for the limited artillery, this is twice the combat power of a divisional brigade and is as large as a World War II armor division! Deploying two ACRs together would provide about the same combat power as an entire heavy division while staying below 10,000 soldiers.

The best part is that we know exactly what an ACR is. We have the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) already in place. We know what sort of corps augmentation is needed for tailored and sustained operations. The modular common structure of the various platoons, troops, and companies allow for rapid conversion from existing tank and mechanized battalions and separate companies. Leader development at squadron level and above needs to be intensive, but so what else is new? In fact, isn't that the way it should be?

As an initial step, we should modify existing divisional cavalry squadrons to mirror the organization of regimental squadrons. Adding a tank company and a field artillery battery is an easy first step and leads to doctrinal and organizational commonality. As the conversion of divisions begins, cavalry squadrons can become the cadre or, if needed, elements of the initial deploying cavalry regiment.

Of course, there will be numerous "adjustments" to be considered. Unlike a regimental squadron, the division cavalry squadron has

two air recon troops and an aviation service troop. I suggest that they remain until the division cavalry is assigned to a regiment, at which time the aviation assets will either join the new regiment's aviation squadron or revert to the parent division's aviation brigade.

Adding an infantry (mounted rifle) platoon (4 IFVs) to each cavalry troop may be desirable. The total increase to the regiment is 9 platoons of 36 IFVs and about 320 soldiers.

As units convert to ACR structure, brigade recon troops (BRT) of heavy divisions and scout platoons of tank and mechanized battalions become redundant and are a ready pool of trained cavalrymen.

At some point, sooner rather than later, we must also consider (again) a light ACR and squadrons (with emphasis on "A" for "armored"). This is easiest of all, since the 2d ACR (Light) is undergoing conversion plans right now. Just do it. Throw out the never-ending, ever-expanding draft operational and organizational concept and simply use existing doctrine and structure, but substitute light vehicles. Where the ACR has Abrams tanks, substitute Bradleys now as a "page-holder" until a light tank or armored gun system is available. Where the ACR has Bradleys, insert armored personnel carriers or Strykers until a future recon scout vehicle is available. The remaining regimental and squadron units remain identical. DONE!

Really — it's that simple! Pump the bellows and get the fire hot! Forge that transformed thunderbolt!

LTC CHESTER A. KOJRO
U.S. Army, Retired

The Light M1 for Light Divisions

Dear *ARMOR*,

A light M1 is not a perfect solution, but such a vehicle can be in units in less than 60 days:

Take the first production series 105mm-armed M1 tank (shorter turret) and remove the spe-

cial armor package and side skirts to create a tank with a weight of 50 tons or less. Equip three battalions with the light M1 — the 82d Airborne, 101st Air Mobile, and XVIII Corps. This provides the U.S. Army a tank with no capital expenditure, no new training for tank crewmen, no new maintenance training, all parts in the inventory, larger amount of on-board main gun ammo, more types of main gun rounds, and two of these light tanks can be carried in a C5. The empty special armor pockets can be used for additional storage, or armor packages can be shipped separately for field installation. The light M1 will have lower survivability, less firepower than the 120mm, and cannot be air dropped. The one training issue will be crews having less protection against direct fire attack.

CHRIS SCHNEIDER
U.S. Army, Retired

Corrections

In its November-December issue, *ARMOR* printed the Army National Guard Unit List on page 46. While compiling the unit lists, one unit was inadvertently overlooked. We apologize for the oversight and thank Lieutenant Colonel Walter Lord for bringing this to our attention.

The unit, 2d Squadron, 104th Cavalry (RSTA), serves as the recon, surveillance, and target acquisition squadron for 56th Brigade, 28th Infantry Division, and is the Guard's only Stryker Brigade Combat Team. They are actively seeking qualified soldiers to join their ranks. The unit is a member of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard, located at 2601 River Road, Reading, PA 19605; telephone (610) 929-8130; fax (601) 378-4515. Serving as commander is Lieutenant Colonel W. Lord and serving as command sergeant major is CSM R. Heller.

Also, 2-194 Armor, Minnesota Army National Guard was incorrectly listed as 2-94 AR. We apologize for the error.

Author Seeks Consultants on Tank Warfare in North Korea

Dear *ARMOR*,

I have just been commissioned by Berkley books to write a series of novels about near-future tank warfare in North Korea. I am seeking as much information as I can about the units operating in the region (such as First Tank — I've visited their web page). Also, I would like to engage in some e-mail contact with real veterans who can lend their insights to make my books much more believable. If you are interested and have time to answer a few questions via e-mail, I would be happy to thank you in the novels and give you free, signed copies for bragging rights with your buddies and spouses. I wish I could do more, but my name is Peter Telep, not Tom Clancy. Contact me at ptelep@aol.com.

PETER TELEP
Department of English
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75 Years Ago:

Experiments on Motor Transport for Horses

The continuation by the War Department of experiments in transportation of horses by motor has resulted in the issuance of instructions to the Quartermaster General to conduct tests on the carrying of six horses in a truck. These experiments are to be different from the ones conducted so far in that the horses are to stand facing forward and three abreast, to facilitate loading to maintain better balance against the sway incident to movement. Heretofore as many as six horses have been loaded in a truck but they have been faced alternately to the sides of the truck. The ordinary Army trucks now in use are believed to be of too short a wheel base to permit transportation of more than three horses facing to the front or rear. If Army trucks of sufficient wheel base and body length are not available, the Quartermaster General will consider the use of a commercial vehicle specially designed for this purpose.

— *The Cavalry Journal*, January 1929